



The Confusion Continues: The New Dynamic of the 
Economic Loss Doctrine in Kansas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic loss doctrine has been labeled “obscure,” “confusing,” 
and “concerning.”
1
  In its most basic form, the economic loss doctrine bars 
plaintiffs from making tort claims based on only economic losses.
2
  The 
doctrine is most typically applied to product liability claims.
3
  When the 
doctrine is applied, plaintiffs can recover for economic losses—as opposed 
to personal injury or property damage—only if they win on some other 
claim, such as breach of warranty.
4
  Although a precise definition of 
economic loss is difficult to ascertain and varies by jurisdiction, it 
encompasses “loss of the bargain, repair and replacement cost, loss of 
profits, and/or goodwill, including diminution in value.”
5
  The economic loss 
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 1.  John J. Laubmeier, Comment, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 225, 225 (2005) (noting the description of economic loss as “an obscure legal 
doctrine”); Laura A. Wagner, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine: A Recommendation for the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 825, 831 (2011) (“The state of the [economic 
loss doctrine] in Pennsylvania is highly confusing and allows for little to no predictability.”); R. 
Thomas Cane & Sheila Sullivan, More Litigation to Come: Exceptions to the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, WIS. LAW., Nov. 2005, at 10 (noting Wisconsin courts’ concern with the doctrine). 
 2.  Laubmeier, supra note 1, at 225 (“The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created 
doctrine that bars recovery in tort for strictly economic losses arising from a contract.”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Hall v. Raley’s, No. 3:08–CV–00632–RCJ–VPC, 2010 WL 55332, at *9 (D. Nev. 
Jan. 6, 2010) (citing Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Nev. 2000)) (“The 
economic loss doctrine was developed in product liability cases and states that there can be no 
recovery for purely economic losses in tort.”). 
 4.  Andrew Gray, Note, Drowning in A Sea of Confusion: Applying the Economic Loss 
Doctrine to Component Parts, Service Contracts, and Fraud, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1513, 1518 
(2006) (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal. 1965)) (explaining the view under 
the doctrine that “warranty law and contract remedies should govern the economic relations between 
the parties unless the product caused ‘personal injury’ or ‘physical injury to the plaintiff’s 
property’”). 
 5.  Kevin J. Breer & Justin D. Pulikkan, The Economic Loss Rule in Kansas and Its Impact on 
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doctrine was created judicially and has been adopted in various forms 
throughout the United States.
6
  The rationale for the doctrine began with the 
concern for unlimited liability because economic losses can result in wide-
ranging liability based on one product.
7
  Courts also felt that the doctrine 
was needed to help separate warranty and tort claims, and to prevent 
warranty law from “drown[ing] in a sea of tort.”
8
  Recently, courts and 
commentators have recognized that the pendulum has swung and that 




In Kansas, the economic loss doctrine developed in the 1990s after the 
expansion of the doctrine in other jurisdictions.
10
  After the official adoption 
of the doctrine barred tort recovery for economic losses, Kansas courts 
began to expand the doctrine to contexts outside business products liability 
claims.
11
  However, after more than a decade of the doctrine’s expansion in 
Kansas, the Kansas courts issued three cases that limit the reach of the 
doctrine.  David v. Hett, Coker v. Siler, and Rinehart v. Morton Buildings, 
Inc. arose in the home construction context, and each case held that the 
economic loss doctrine did not bar the plaintiffs’ tort claims.
12
 
                                                          
Construction Cases, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, June 2005, at 30, 30 (citing Nw. Ark. Mansonry, Inc. v. 
Summit Specialty Prods., Inc., 31 P.3d 982, 986–87 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)).  
 6.  Gray, supra note 4, at 1513 (“The doctrine was judicially developed to protect the right to 
allocate economic risks in contract.”); see generally AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STATE BY STATE 
SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION (1996) (explaining the 
various approaches by states in applying the doctrine to construction cases). 
 7.  See Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Nobility Homes of 
Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1977)) (recognizing that courts “fear that holding 
manufacturers liable for economic loss imposes unlimited and unforeseeable liability upon 
manufacturers”). 
 8.  E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986). 
 9.  See, e.g., La Pesca Grande Charters, Inc. v. Moran, 704 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
5th 1998) (“It is no more desirable to have tort law drown in a sea of contract than to have contract 
law drown in a sea of tort.”).  See also R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in A Sea of Contract: 
Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1789, 1791–92 (2000) (“Just as overextension of products liability would drown 
contract in a sea of tort, so too would over application of the economic loss rule drown 
misrepresentation claims in a sea of contract.”). 
 10.  Koss Const. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255, 259–60 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the 
economic loss doctrine and ultimately holding “that a commercial buyer of defective goods cannot 
sue in negligence or strict liability where the only injury consists of damage to the goods 
themselves” because “the economic loss doctrine applies to a claim for damage to the product 
itself”).  
 11.  See Jordan v. Case Corp., 993 P.2d 650, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the doctrine to 
consumer products liability claims); Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods., Inc., 31 
P.3d 982, 989 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the doctrine to a claim in the construction context for 
defective cement). 
 12.  David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102 (Kan. 2011); Coker v. Siler, 304 P.3d 689 (Kan. Ct. App. 
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The justifications for the economic loss doctrine do not exist in the 
home construction context, as the courts in David, Coker, and Rinehart 
properly recognized.  However, each case raises questions about the scope of 
the doctrine in the home construction context and which economic loss 
claims a homeowner can bring in tort.  These questions need to be addressed 
to ensure that the doctrine is applied correctly in the future. 
This Comment analyzes the development of the economic loss doctrine 
in Kansas and the impact of these three recent cases.  Although the cases 
seem logical in their limited holdings, they each create problems regarding 
the limitation of the doctrine outside the home construction context, the 
further blurring of the line between warranty and tort law, and the scope of 
tort liability for home construction defects.  However, Kansas courts can 
begin to fix these problems by doing two things.  First, Kansas courts should 
explicitly incorporate the independent duty rule into their economic loss 
doctrine analysis.  Second, Kansas courts should consider several factors—
the gravity of harm of the defect, the bargaining positions of the parties, the 
nature of the claim’s source as a service or a product, and whether the defect 
creates a non-economic risk of harm—to determine which home 
construction economic loss claims warrant recovery in tort. 
Part II of this Comment explores the development of the economic loss 
doctrine in the United States and Kansas.  First, it illustrates the 
development of the doctrine throughout the United States by explaining the 
doctrine’s expansion and the ways in which courts have attempted to limit 
its scope through the creation of various exceptions.  Part II also explores the 
development of the doctrine in Kansas courts, first with its adoption in the 
products liability context and then with its expansion into construction cases.  
Part III analyzes the three recent cases and discusses the ways in which the 
courts properly limited the doctrine.  Part III also analyzes three specific 
problems that the recent Kansas cases created.  Finally, this Comment 
explores the solutions Kansas courts can apply to begin to fix these 
problems. 
                                                          
2013); Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 305 P.3d 622 (Kan. 2013). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of the Economic Loss Doctrine in the United States 
1. The Introduction of Tort Law to Products Liability and the Response 
by the Economic Loss Doctrine 
The economic loss doctrine developed in the context of products 
liability law.
13
  In the early twentieth century, consumers injured by 
defective products could recover under negligence law and warranty law.  
However, both of these claims were often defeated by contractual warranty 
disclaimers or by the privity limitation, thereby creating harsh results for 
consumers.
14
  Traditional warranty law placed two major limitations on 
recovery by consumers of defective products.  First, throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century, enforcement of warranty disclaimers prevented 
consumers from successfully asserting breach of warranty actions to recover 
damages caused by defective products.
15
  Product manufacturers and sellers 
could disclaim all liability, some liability, or limit the availability of certain 
remedies.
16
  Manufacturers and sellers of defective goods could thereby 
prevent liability if the manufacturer or seller successfully disclaimed 
liability.
17
  Second, courts required contractual privity between the consumer 
                                                          
 13.  Steven C. Tourek, Thomas H. Boyd, & Charles J. Schoenwetter, Bucking the “Trend”: The 
Uniform Commercial Code, The Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of Action for 
Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L. REV. 875, 891 (1999) (“The Economic Loss Doctrine was 
developed to prevent product liability ‘torts’ from circumventing the objectives and terms of the 
U.C.C.”); Hall v. Raley’s, No. 3:08–CV–00632–RCJ–VPC, 2010 WL 55332, at *9 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 
2010) (citing Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Nev. 2000)) (explaining that “the 
economic loss doctrine was developed in product liability cases”). 
 14.  See Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 44 (1955) (stating that the 
privity doctrine “was well adapted to protect the manufacturer from burdens on his activity, but it 
did so at the expense of the victims of his mistakes,” and that products liability law developed in 
response “to ever-growing pressure for protection of the consumer, coupled with a realization that 
liability would not unduly inhibit the enterprise of manufacturers”). 
 15.  See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1131–33 (1960) (explaining that the traditional enforcement of warranty disclaimers 
barred recovery for consumers of defective products in the absence of negligence claims). 
 16.  Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 101 N.W. 903, 904 (N.D. 1904) (enforcing a limitation of a 
drill warranty covering only “breakage caused by manifest defects in materials”); Burntisland 
Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Prods. Corp., 278 F. 552, 553 (D. Del. 1922) (enforcing complete 
disclaimer of liability by seller of steel); Helvetia Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co., 171 N.W. 272, 274 
(Minn. 1919) (enforcing limitation of remedies to repair or refund of purchase price). 
 17.  See Gearing v. Berkson, 111 N.E. 785, 223 Mass. 257, 260 (Mass. 1916) (dismissing a 
claim for unwholesome pork chops because of “the absence both of an implied warranty and of 
negligence on the part of the defendants”).   
  
2014] KANSAS ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 1329 
and the party it was suing in negligence.
18
  This defeated tort claims by 
consumers who did not directly buy the product from the defendant.  
Consumer buyers were often left to sue insolvent retailers rather than the 
deep-pocketed manufacturers who created the defective product.
19
 
The adoption of strict liability for defective products came as a response 
to the perception that the limitations of traditional negligence and warranty 
law imposed too great of a burden on consumers.
20
  Courts first began to 
adopt strict liability in the context of defective or unwholesome foods.
21
  In 
1963, the Supreme Court of California held in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he 
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for 
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”
22
  The 
court stated that the doctrine was necessary “to insure that the costs of 
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers 
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who 
are powerless to protect themselves.”
23
  After Greenman, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts adopted strict liability for the defective products rule in 
§402A.
24
  These two developments prompted states to adopt strict liability 
for defective products, which eliminated many of the defenses available 
under traditional negligence and warranty law.
25
  The economic loss doctrine 
therefore arose in the context of the competing theories of warranty and 
products liability law, and attempted to draw a line of demarcation between 
                                                          
 18.  James Jr., supra note 14, at 44 (explaining that courts at the beginning of the 20th century 
were reluctant to find liability for defective products in the absence of contractual privity). 
 19.  See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 205 P. 1118, 1119 (Idaho 1922) 
(denying recovery to plaintiff who had no “contractual relation” with the manufacturer it sued).  See 
also James Jr., supra note 14, at 44 (explaining that at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
recovery was “limited to the parties” of a contract, rather than “those who might foreseeably be 
injured” by use of the defective product). 
 20.  See Prosser, supra note 15, at 1131–33 (stating that the general enforcement of warranty 
disclaimers in products cases places “dangerous power . . . in the hands of the seller”); James Jr., 
supra note 14, at 44 (stating that the privity requirement helped “protect the manufacturer from 
burdens on his activity, but it did so at the expense of the victims of his mistakes”). 
 21.  Prosser, supra note 15, at 1104 (citations omitted) (explaining that early American courts 
“imposed strict liability upon the seller of food, in favor of his purchaser, as ‘a principle, not only 
salutary, but necessary to the preservation of health and life’”). 
 22.  377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
 23.  Id. at 901.  
 24.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 25.  See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 718 (1970) (“Since the adoption of section 402A in 
196[5], it has become increasingly clear that the principal effect of the strict tort liability rule has 
been the elimination of defenses based on traditional warranty guidelines in products-liability 
cases.”). 
  




2. Seely v. White Motor Co.
27
 
The economic loss doctrine was first officially adopted by the California 
Supreme Court in the 1965 case of Seely v. White Motor Co.
28
  The plaintiff, 
Seely, bought a truck manufactured by White Motor Co., and the truck 
overturned when the brakes malfunctioned.
29
  Although Seely was not 
physically injured, he brought claims of “breach of express warranty, breach 
of warranty of fitness for purpose of intended use, breach of contract” and 
strict liability in tort for the purchase price, lost profits, and repairs to the 
truck.
30
  Seely initially brought these claims against White Motor Co. and 
the retailer, Southern Truck Sales, but dismissed the action against 
Southern.
31
  The California Supreme Court affirmed lower court rulings 
permitting warranty recovery for the purchase price and lost profits—but not 
the repairs—and denying tort liability.
32
 
In affirming the court of appeals, the supreme court explained the 
economic loss doctrine: 
[Defendant] can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries 
caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety 
defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. 
                                                          
 26.  See, e.g., Koss Const. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255, 259–60 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
 27.  403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (en banc).  
 28.  Breer & Pulikkan, supra note 5, at 31 (citing Seely, 403 P.2d at 147–48). 
 29.   Seely, 403 P.2d at 147. 
 30.  Seely v. White Motor Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 805, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), vacated, 403 P.2d 
145 (Cal. 1965) (en banc); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147–48 (Cal. 1965). 
 31.  Seely, 403 P.2d at 148. 
 32.  Id. at 152.  The California District Court of Appeals affirmed Seely’s recovery against 
White Motor Co. on the purchase price and lost profits because White Motor Co. breached the 
express warranty.  Seely, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 808.  At the time of this case California had adopted the 
UCC, which states that an express warranty is created “if the natural tendency of [an] affirmation of 
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying 
thereon.”  Seely, 403 P.2d at 148 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1732 (repealed 1979)).  White Motor Co. 
limited the express warranty to repair and replacement, and the court found that White breached this 
warranty by failing to repair the truck.  Seely, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 808.  Turning to plaintiff’s strict 
liability claim, the court noted that the trial court failed to make a ruling on this issue.  Id. at 810.  
However, the court held this was not reversible error because product liability claims were 
recoverable only for personal injury claims.  Id. at 812.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of California 
affirmed the court of appeals ruling.  Seely, 403 P.2d at 152.  The supreme court first upheld the 
award of damages for the purchase price and lost profits based on the breach of express warranty, 
because these losses directly resulted “in the ordinary course of events from the breach of warranty.”  
Id. at 148–49.  The court also affirmed the denial of Seely’s breach of warranty claim for repair costs 
because Seely failed to show causation.  Id. at 152. 
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He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the 
consumer’s business unless he agrees that the product was designed to 
meet the consumer’s demands.
33
 
In other words, economic losses to the consumer caused by the 
product’s performance in the consumer’s business are a matter for 
agreement, or warranty, while physical injuries are for “a standard of safety” 
imposed by the law regardless of the agreement.  The court worried that if a 
manufacturer was held strictly liable in tort for economic damages, thereby 
preventing the manufacturer from defining the scope of its liability through 
warranty, “[t]he manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown and 
unlimited scope.”
34
  The court therefore held that a plaintiff could recover in 
tort for physical injury and property damage, but not for “his economic 
expectations.”
35
  Applying this doctrine to Seely’s claim, the court found 
that the claim for cost of repairs was for physical damage to the truck, and 
therefore was recoverable on a strict liability theory.
36
  However, because 
Seely failed to show “that the defect caused the physical damage [to] the 
truck,” he could not recover on this basis.
37
 
Dissenting, Justice Peters argued that because the court found White 
Motor Co. liable on the breach of warranty claim, it was unnecessary for the 
court to decide that Seely could not recover on his strict liability claim.
38
  
Therefore, Justice Peters argued, “[e]verything said by the majority on that 
subject is obviously dicta.”
39
  Despite Justice Peters’s concerns, the Seely 
Court’s explanation of the economic loss doctrine has been continuously 
cited as the first formal adoption of the doctrine.
40
 
3. The Impact of the Concern for Unlimited Liability 
A line of cases before Seely dealt with the potential for unlimited 
                                                          
 33.  Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. 
 34.  Id. at 150–51. 
 35.  Id. at 152. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 153 (Peters, J., dissenting) (“The majority, having found in favor of the plaintiff on 
the theory of an express warranty, completely decided the case.  There was no need to discuss the 
strict liability doctrine.”). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Mich. 1992) (referring to 
Seely: “the decision [is] generally regarded as the genesis of the doctrine”); Vincent R. Johnson, The 
Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 585 (2009) 
(stating that “[t]he branch of the rule denying compensation under tort law for harm caused by 
defective products originated with Seely”). 
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liability, and this theme later fueled the concern for unlimited liability in 
economic loss cases like Seely.
41
  One of the earliest examples was the 1866 
case of Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co., involving the negligent 
spreading of a fire.
42
  This case focused primarily on proximate cause, but 
there was a strong undercurrent of concern for the unlimited liability that 
would ensue if law attempted to hold the negligent tortfeasor liable for all 
harms to property: 
A man may insure his own house or his own furniture, but he cannot 
insure his neighbor’s building or furniture, for the reason that he has no 
interest in them. To hold that the owner must not only meet his own 
loss by fire, but that he must guarantee the security of his neighbors on 
both sides, and to an unlimited extent, would be to create a liability 
which would be the destruction of all civilized society
43
 
Fear of unlimited liability in economic loss cases continued after Seely.  
Courts felt that allowing tort recovery—or even recovery without privity—in 
cases of economic loss would lead to liability on an unmanageable scale.
44
  
The 1968 negligence case Kinsman II involved a cargo ship that broke free 
from its moorings, struck a second ship, and crashed into a bridge, causing 
flooding when the two ships and the bridge formed a dam.
45
  The court 
denied recovery to plaintiffs, holding that the economic losses they incurred 
as a result of the flooding—based on an inability “to move traffic along the 
river”—were too remote from the negligence.
46
  The court reasoned that the 
prevention of unlimited liability required it to draw a line barring claims that 
were “too tenuous and remote to permit recovery.”
47
  Courts have continued 
to cite the policies of unlimited liability and foreseeability as a driving factor 
in not allowing tort recovery for economic losses.
48
  In contrast, courts have 
less concern about unlimited liability for economic loss in warranty actions 
                                                          
 41.  Seely, 403 P.2d at 150–51 (discussing the concern for unlimited liability). 
 42.  35 N.Y. 210 (N.Y. 1866). 
 43.  Id. at 216–17. 
 44.  Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1977) (“Courts which 
have declined to overturn the privity requirement in warranty actions for economic loss have 
reasoned that . . . holding manufacturers liable for economic loss imposes unlimited and 
unforeseeable liability upon manufacturers.”). 
 45.  In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 822–23 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 46.  Id. at 824–25. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  See, e.g., S.A.I., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Railcar Servs. Corp., 935 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D. Kan. 
1996) (“The economic loss doctrine serves to protect against infringement of the remedies that have 
been articulated by the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as to guard the manufacturer against 
unlimited liability in its manufacture of products.”). 
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because defendants can limit their liability in the terms of the warranty.
49
  A 
warranty defendant subject to unlimited liability has, in a sense, only itself to 
blame for its failure to anticipate that risk and draft the warranty 
accordingly. 
4. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Co. 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court adopted the economic loss 
doctrine in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.
50
  East 
River, charterers of a supertanker, brought an action against Transamerica 
Delaval for negligence, strict liability, breach of contract and breach of 
warranty after a turbine installed by Transamerica malfunctioned.
51
  The 
only damage was to the turbines themselves.
52
  After Transamerica 
submitted a statute of limitations defense, East River amended its complaint 
and brought only the negligence and strict liability claims.
53
  Therefore, the 
Court had to “decide whether a cause of action in tort is stated when a 
defective product purchased in a commercial transaction malfunctions, 
injuring only the product itself and causing purely economic loss.”
54
 
The East River Court explained the spectrum of holdings on economic 
loss cases at the time.  A majority of courts had adopted the economic loss 
doctrine, denying recovery in tort for claims of purely economic loss.
55
  A 
minority of courts had allowed economic loss recovery based on the theory 
that a distinction between physical and economic damage is “arbitrary.”
56
  
Finally, some courts took “intermediate positions” and allowed recovery for 
economic losses when the product created an unreasonable risk of harm but 
did not cause physical injury.
57
  The Supreme Court rejected both the 
minority and intermediate approaches and adopted the economic loss 
doctrine, because the intermediate approach prevented business managers 
from properly allocating risk and the minority approach failed to 
                                                          
 49.  See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (explaining that 
“[a]pplication of the rules of warranty prevents” the problem of a manufacturer being unable to 
define its scope of legal responsibility). 
 50.  476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
 51.  Id. at 861. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 859. 
 55.  Id. at 868. 
 56.  Id. at 869. 
 57.  Id. at 870. 
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contemplate limits on product liability actions.
58
 
However, the Court stated that a main reason for adopting the economic 
loss doctrine was to prevent the deterioration of the line between warranty 
and tort law.
59
  The Court continued to emphasize this theme throughout its 
opinion.
60
  At one point, the Court famously declared that, without the 
economic loss doctrine, “contract law would drown in a sea of tort.”
61
  
Therefore, the Court adopted the following doctrine: “whether stated in 
negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim lies in admiralty 
when the only injury claimed is economic loss.”
62
 
Although the East River Court emphasized the distinction between tort 
and warranty law as its main reason for adopting the economic loss doctrine, 
it discussed other policy factors that influenced its decision.  First, the Court 
highlighted the business nature of the transaction, as opposed to a consumer 
transaction, as a reason society had a lesser interest in ensuring the buyer’s 
recovery beyond the terms of a warranty.
63
  The Court also stated its concern 
with the potential for unlimited liability without the economic loss 
doctrine.
64
  Finally, the Court found that adoption of the doctrine promoted 
efficient bargaining between parties, especially when the parties held equal 
bargaining power.
65
  These secondary policies later influenced the expansion 
of the doctrine into a variety of contexts. 
5. Expansion of the Doctrine After East River 
After the East River opinion, courts in various jurisdictions quickly 
adapted the economic loss doctrine to products liability cases outside the 
admiralty context.
66
  These cases represent the economic loss doctrine at its 
                                                          
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 870–71 (citing “the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate 
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages” as the most powerful argument). 
 60.  Id. at 866 (citing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87–94 (1974) (stating that 
without a limitation on products liability law, “contract law would drown in a sea of tort”)). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 876. 
 63.  Id. at 871–72 (comparing the societal interest in providing recovery for personal injuries, 
which may create “overwhelming misfortune,” with the interest in providing recovery for a 
commercial user whose product does not meet contractual expectations). 
 64.  Id. at 874 (“Permitting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could 
make a manufacturer liable for vast sums.”). 
 65.  Id. at 873 (“While giving recognition to the manufacturer’s bargain, warranty law 
sufficiently protects the purchaser by allowing it to obtain the benefit of its bargain.”). 
 66.  E.g., REM Coal Co., Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(“[W]e adopt the standard unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court in [East River], under which 
recovery in tort is barred in product liability actions between commercial enterprises where the only 
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most basic level.  Courts have recognized that the origins of the doctrine are 
traced to business—as opposed to consumer—products liability cases and 
that many contemporary cases apply the doctrine in the business products 
liability context.
67
  In addition, courts began to expand the doctrine beyond 
this context based on the policies set forth in East River and other early 
cases. 
First, courts extended the economic loss doctrine to deny recovery in 
cases in which a product caused damage to a purchaser’s property, as in East 
River.
68
  These courts reasoned that, if the damage was within the 
contemplation of the parties, the proper method of risk allocation was the 




Courts also expanded the doctrine by applying it to the construction 
context.
70
  Although these cases usually involved claims based on both 
products and services, the courts found that the policies announced in East 
River and other early cases applied with equal force.
71
  Many jurisdictions 
applied the doctrine in cases outside the business context, arguing that the 
proper distinction was between economic and physical damages rather than 
business and consumer contracts.
72
  Other courts began applying the doctrine 
                                                          
damage alleged is to the product itself.”). 
 67.  E.g., Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 16 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.N. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997)) (recognizing that “[t]he rule 
developed as a way of enforcing the dictates of privity in product liability law” and that “the 
majority of cases enunciating the economic loss rule have arisen in the context of product liability”).  
 68.  Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Mich. 1992) (economic 
loss doctrine barred plaintiffs’ claims based on allegedly defective milking product that caused 
injury to plaintiffs’ cows); Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., a Div. of Amcord, Inc., 91 
F.3d 1094, 1100–01 (8th Cir. 1996) (economic loss doctrine applied to a claim by the owner of a 
natural gas production plant against a supplier of steel structural components for damage caused to 
owner’s plant). 
 69.  Eric R. Skinner, The Expansion of the Economic Loss Doctrine: Neibarger v. Universal 
Cooperatives, Inc., 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1007, 1007–08 (1993) (describing the expansion of the 
doctrine to situations in which “such damage is found to have been within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of bargaining”).  
 70.  E.g., Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992 (Wash. 
1994) (deciding to “maintain the fundamental boundaries of tort and contract law by limiting the 
recovery of economic loss due to construction delays to the remedies provided by contract”). 
 71.  See id. (discussing the concern for unlimited liability as a factor in the court’s decision); 
see also Wausau Paper Mills Co. v. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 968, 974 (W.D. Wis. 1992) 
(stating that the plaintiff’s economic loss through construction services was simply a failure “of the 
purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain—traditionally the core concern of contract law”). 
 72.  See Roehm v. Charter Mobile Home Moving Co., 907 F. Supp. 1110, 1113 (W.D. Mich. 
1993) (citing Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980)) (noting that the 
Michigan Supreme Court had previously held that a consumer plaintiff could not bring tort claims 
for economic losses without allegations and proof of the tortious conduct that is independent of the 
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B. Limitation of the Economic Loss Doctrine Through the Creation of 
Exceptions 
While some courts continued to expand application of the economic loss 
doctrine, others began to use the same policies driving expansion to limit the 
doctrine.  For example, the economic loss doctrine does not apply to damage 
that a product causes to a purchaser’s “other property.”
74
  This exception 
was adopted because courts treat personal injury and property damage 
alike.
75
  However, the “other property” exception has created significant 
confusion among courts having to distinguish between the purchaser’s 
“other property” and “component parts” of the product at issue.
76
  Generally, 
courts have held that something that is part of the integrated structure of an 
item or is part of the finished product is a “component part” of the product 
rather than “other property.”
77
 
Additionally, some jurisdictions allow tort recovery in cases involving 
services rather than products.
78
  According to these courts, the justification 
for this exception lies with the underlying purposes of warranty and tort 
law.
79
  Because the UCC sales chapter applies to sales of goods, warranty 
law is more appropriate where goods are involved, whereas tort law is more 
                                                          
contract breach).  
 73.  See A. Dean Bennett, The “Unique Circumstances” Exception to the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, ADVOC. (IDAHO), March/Apr. 2009, at 26, 26 (providing that “the rule is now applied in 
negligence cases where the concept of proximate cause has traditionally been the gatekeeper to a 
plaintiff’s recovery,” and is also applied to “the poor performance of services”).  
 74.  E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986) (stating that a 
manufacturer’s duty of care extends to “protection against property damage”). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See Lynn E. Wagner & Richard A. Solomon, Finally A Concrete Decision: The Supreme 
Court of Florida Ends the Confusion Surrounding the Economic Loss Doctrine, 68 FLA. B.J. 46, 52 
(1994) (“The ‘other’ property exception has, perhaps, spawned more debate and confusion than any 
other issue concerning the economic loss doctrine.”). 
77. E.g., Bay Breeze Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Norco Windows, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 738, 746 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
 78.  See Kalahari Dev., LLC v. Iconica, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 825, 831–32 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) 
(stating that if a claim is based more on products than services the economic loss doctrine applies, 
but if the claim is based more on services the economic loss doctrine does not bar recovery). 
 79.  Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 699 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. 2005) (stating that the 
predominant purpose test for distinguishing between products and services was developed in the 
UCC Article 2 (regulating sales of goods) context). 
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applicable in the services context.
80
  Courts also cite the informal nature of 




Some courts also allow tort recovery for economic losses in fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation claims.  Courts generally take one of three 
approaches when faced with economic loss claims based on fraud.
82
  First, 
some courts apply the economic loss doctrine in its usual fashion and hold 
that the defrauded party’s claim is solely contract, not tort.
83
  Second, some 
courts allow tort claims for economic losses in cases of fraud.
84
  Finally, an 
intermediate rule, adopted by some courts, allows tort recovery when “the 
fraud is not interwoven with the quality or character of the goods or 
otherwise involves performance of the contract.”
85
  Another set of courts 
also allows tort recovery in cases of negligent misrepresentation.
86
  These 
courts cite the rationale that because both fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation may provide bases for liability independent of a contract, 
the exception should apply to both forms of misrepresentation.
87
  Therefore, 
the fraud and negligent misrepresentation exceptions place further 
limitations on the economic loss doctrine. 
The independent duty rule acts as another common limitation on the 
economic loss doctrine.  The independent duty rule allows economic loss 
claims in tort when the duty can be traced to a source other than the parties’ 
contract.
88
  When the duty underlying a claim can be traced to both a 
                                                          
 80.  See id. (stating that because UCC Article 2 applies to goods, it is necessary to determine 
whether goods or services are more predominant in a claim); see also Gray, supra note 4, at 1535 
(explaining that one argument against applying the economic loss doctrine to services claims is that 
“there is no equivalent to the Uniform Commercial Code for the interactions of parties in a service 
industry”). 
 81.  See Gray, supra note 4, at 1535 (“[A]pplying the doctrine to limit remedies is discouraged 
by the fact that many service contracts are oral.”); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 
N.W.2d 462, 470 (Wis. 2004) (“Because of the informal circumstances surrounding most oral 
contracts for services, the policy provisions underpinning the application of the economic loss 
doctrine do not readily apply.”). 
 82.  Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 921, 931 (2007). 
 83.  See id. (“The first approach is to ignore the fraud and the defrauded party’s remedy is 
solely contract, not tort.”). 
 84.   See Robinson Helicopter Co., v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 272 (Cal. 2004) (finding that 
“the Court of Appeal erred in its decision because the economic loss rule does not bar [the 
plaintiff’s] fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims”). 
 85.  See Anzivino, supra note 82, at 933. 
 86.  Barton, supra note 9, at 1791–92 (explaining that Florida courts do not extend the 
economic loss rule to claims of misrepresentation). 
 87.  Id. at 1792–93. 
 88.  See Jacob W. Crouse, Note, A Long Road Ahead: Determining the Application of the 
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contractual and tort law source, the plaintiff is limited to warranty 
remedies.
89
  However, when the duty can be found in tort independent of the 
parties’ contract terms, the plaintiff’s economic loss claims are allowed in 
tort.
90
  For example, if the parties did not include in their contract the duty to 
refrain from making misrepresentations, the tort duty to do so would apply.  
The independent duty rule has gained wide acceptance in recent years,
91
 but 
courts and commentators continue to debate the scope of this exception.
92
 
C. Development of the Economic Loss Doctrine in Kansas 
The Kansas Court of Appeals formally adopted the economic loss 
doctrine in 1998 in Koss Construction v. Caterpillar, Inc.
93
  The court based 
its adoption of the doctrine primarily on the application of the doctrine by 
other jurisdictions and its own view that East River represented a 
“straightforward” and “predictable” approach.
94
  However, before this 
formal adoption of the doctrine, several Kansas cases recognized the 
economic loss doctrine and its policies.
95
  These cases applied the doctrine 
                                                          
Economic-Loss Doctrine to Service Contracts in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 49 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 445, 452–53 (2011) (explaining the Colorado Supreme Court’s application of the 
independent duty rule). 
 89.  See Johnson, supra note 40, at 526–27 (“[T]here is a consensus that the breach of a purely 
contractual duty is not actionable as a tort if the only consequences are economic losses.”). 
 90.  See id. at 539–40 (explaining that application of the independent duty rule means that 
economic loss claims are barred “[o]nly where a contract expressly or by necessary implication 
elects to replace tort principles actually or potentially establishing an independent duty”); see also 
DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 615 (2013) (“[T]he tort duty, to be actionable, must not 
be ‘interwoven’ with the contract.”). 
 91.  See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 615 n.10.50 (“This ‘independent duty rule’ appears 
to be gaining some momentum.”). 
 92.  See Johnson, supra note 40, at 539–40 (explaining that some courts bar claims based on 
independent tort duties if the duty relates “to the subject matter of an existing contract, [is] based on 
the same facts as a breach of contract claim, or involve[s] ‘disappointed’ commercial expectations 
related to the contract”). 
 93.  Koss Const. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255, 260 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (“[W]e conclude 
that a commercial buyer of defective goods cannot sue in negligence or strict liability where the only 
injury consists of damage to the goods themselves.”); David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1110 (Kan. 
2011) (stating that the Koss Construction court applied the economic loss doctrine “as an issue of 
first impression”). 
 94.  Koss Const., 960 P.2d at 259. 
 95.  See, e.g., Elite Prof’ls, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (not 
applying the economic loss doctrine because plaintiff’s recovery “is not sought for economic loss” 
but recognizing “the principle that recovery for economic loss is not available in an action sounding 
in tort”); Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898–99 (Kan. 1984) 
(“[I]mplied warranties of fitness and merchantability are not extended to a remote seller or 
manufacturer of an allegedly defective product, which is not inherently dangerous, for only 
economic loss.”); Broce-O’Dell Concrete Prods, Inc. v. Mel Jarvis Const. Co., 634 P.2d 1142, 1145 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (“If the result is simple economic loss, liability and damages are governed by 
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and its policies without explicitly adopting it.
96
  The Koss Construction 
court’s approach can therefore be seen as the explicit adoption of a policy 
that the Kansas courts had been applying throughout the previous decade. 
Like the courts in East River and Seely, the Koss Construction court first 
adopted the doctrine in the business product liability context.
97
  However, 
Kansas courts soon extended the doctrine to areas such as consumer 
purchases, services, and construction.
98
  This expansion set the stage for the 
courts to consider the limitations of the growing doctrine.  This Comment 
will first discuss expansion of the economic loss doctrine in Kansas, then 
turn to the limitations imposed on it. 
1. Application in Consumer and Business Products Cases 
In Koss Construction, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a vibratory 
roller after the roller was damaged by a defective part.
99
  The plaintiff sued 
under theories of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, negligence, 
and strict liability.
100
  The district court dismissed the breach of warranty 
claim because Koss Construction lacked privity with Caterpillar.
101
  The 
district court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and strict 
liability, citing the economic loss doctrine.
102
  In its opinion affirming the 
district court, the court of appeals noted the persuasiveness of the East River 
decision and the policy goal of establishing a “logical demarcation between 
cases properly pursued as tort actions and those which are warranty 
claims.”
103
  Because economic losses are “traditionally the core concern of 




                                                          
breach of contract principles.”). 
 96.  See Elite Prof’ls, 827 P.2d at 1202 (recognizing the “principle” that economic losses are 
not recoverable in tort). 
 97.  Breer & Pulikkan, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
 98.  E.g., Jordan v. Case Corp., 993 P.2d 650, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the doctrine 
to consumer products liability claims); Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods, Inc., 31 
P.3d 982, 986–87 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the doctrine to a claim in the construction context 
for defective cement). 
 99.  Koss Const., 960 P.2d at 256. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. (“The district court determined that Koss could not recover for simple economic loss to 
the roller under either negligence or strict liability.”). 
 103.  Id. at 259. 
 104.  Id. at 258–59 (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 870 
(1986)). 
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After Koss Construction, the Kansas courts began to expand the 
economic loss doctrine to other contexts.  First, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
extended the doctrine outside the context of business buyers to consumer 
product liability claims in Jordan v. Case Corp.
105
  The Jordan case 
involved claims made by a farmer’s insurer when the farmer’s combine 
caught fire because of an engine defect.
106
  The insurer brought claims 
against the manufacturer based on theories of breach of implied warranty, 
strict liability, and negligence.
107
  Applying the economic loss doctrine from 
Koss, the trial court dismissed the insurer’s claims.
108
  The court of appeals 
affirmed the denial of each of the insurer’s claims.
109
  The insurer argued 
that the engine was other property rather than a component part, and 
therefore the economic loss doctrine should not apply to bar the claim.
110
  
However, the court of appeals found that the engine was a component part of 
the combine, and therefore the doctrine barred the claims.
111
  The court 
effectively extended the doctrine in two ways.  First, it carried the doctrine 
outside the business context and applied it to a consumer claim.
112
  Second, 
although the court did not dismiss the other property exception, the court 
limited its application with its view of the engine as a component part.
113
  
This case therefore represented the beginning of the economic loss 
doctrine’s expansion in Kansas. 
2. Application in the Construction Context 
After Jordan, the Kansas courts extended the economic loss doctrine to 
the construction context through a series of cases.  The Kansas Court of 
Appeals first considered the economic loss doctrine in the construction 
context in the 2001 case of Northwest Arkansas Masonry, Inc. v. Summit 
                                                          
 105.  993 P.2d 650, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); see also Breer & Pulikkan, supra note 5, at 34 
(explaining that Jordan “extended the economic loss doctrine to include consumer purchases”). 
 106.  Jordan, 993 P.2d at 651.  This case constituted a consumer claim because the insurer, as 
the subrogee of Jordan, “stepped into the shoes” of Jordan.  See Halpin v. Frankenberger, 644 P.2d 
452, 457 (Kan. 1982) (“Subrogation, as the term is defined, contemplates one person stepping into 
the shoes of another.”). 
 107.  Jordan, 993 P.2d at 651. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. (“We hold that as a matter of law, the Cummins engine was a component part of the 
combine.”). 
 112.  See Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods, Inc., 31 P.3d 982, 987 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2001) (citing Jordan, 993 P.2d at 651) (describing the effect of Jordan as “expanding the 
economic loss doctrine to both consumer and commercial purchasers of defective products”). 
 113.  Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc., 31 P.3d at 987–88. 
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Specialty Products, Inc.
114
  In Northwest Arkansas, Northwest brought 
contract and product liability claims against Summit, which allegedly 
manufactured defective cement powder.
115
  The court considered whether 
the other property exception applied to the defective cement used by 
Northwest to build a cement wall.
116
  The court found that in construction 
cases, an item must be distinguished as other property or part of an 
“integrated system” of a structure.
117
  If the item is part of an integrated 
system, then the economic loss doctrine bars the tort claim of damage to the 
item.
118
  The court noted several cases in other jurisdictions finding that 
defective cement was part of an integrated system, and then applied the 
economic loss doctrine to bar Northwest’s claim.
119
 
The Kansas Court of Appeals next considered the scope of the economic 
loss doctrine in the construction case Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, 
Inc.
120
  In Prendiville, a homeowner brought claims of breach of warranty, 
negligence, and violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act against the 
project’s contractor after a defect caused flooding in the homeowner’s 
basement.
121
  The defendant filed a summary judgment motion, and the 
district court denied the defendant’s motion on the breach of warranty and 
Consumer Protection Act claims.
122
  The court granted the motion on the 
negligence claim, citing the economic loss doctrine.
123
  On appeal, the 
homeowner argued that the economic loss doctrine should not apply for two 
reasons.
124
  First, the construction of a house constituted a service rather than 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 986–87 (framing the issue on appeal as “[w]hether the trial court erred in concluding 
the economic loss doctrine barred recovery for damages under a strict liability cause of action” for 
defective cement). 
 115.  Id. at 983–84.  
 116.  Id. at 987–88. 
 117.  Id. (explaining that the Restatement (Third) of Torts adopted the integrated systems 
approach after “[r]ecognizing the difficulty in deciding what constitutes harm to the product itself 
versus harm to other property”). 
 118.  Id. at 988  (“When the product or system is deemed to be an integrated whole . . . the 
damage is excluded from the coverage of this Restatement.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21, cmt. e (1997))). 
 119.  Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc., 31 P.3d at 988. 
 120.  83 P.3d 1257 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102 (Kan. 
2011).  
 121.  Id. at 1258–59. 
 122.  Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., No. 00CV1742, 2001 WL 35911172 (Kan. Dist. 
Ct. Sept. 24, 2001). 
 123.  Id.  (“Plaintiff’s Count II is barred by the economic loss doctrine, and Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Count II is granted.”). 
 124.  Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1261–63. 
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a product, and therefore the court should allow tort recovery.
125
  Second, the 
doctrine should not apply in residential cases because of the relative 
inexperience of the buyers.
126
 
The court rejected both arguments.
127
  Although noting a split of 
authorities outside Kansas on the application of the doctrine to residential 
construction cases, the court held that the economic loss doctrine applied 
whether or not the claim was based on a service or product.
128
  It also found 
that the doctrine should apply equally to residential and business parties, and 
that, if an exception for homeowners was to be made, it was up to the 
legislature to do so.
129
  The court focused on the policies underlying the 
doctrine, such as respecting the bargaining process of the parties: 
If Prendiville is allowed to proceed with his negligence claim, this 
would essentially nullify the express warranty agreed upon by the 
parties.  The warranty specifically allowed Prendiville to make claims 
regarding defects or deficiencies in the house for 1 year following the 
issuance of the warranty.  The effect of allowing Prendiville to proceed 
on the negligence claim is to extend the defendants’ potential for 
liability for a greater period of time.
130
 
The concern for unlimited liability and the blurring of lines between 
warranty and tort law fueled the court’s extension of the doctrine to this 
area.  The effect of Northwest Arkansas and Prendiville was that the 
economic loss doctrine in Kansas construction cases applied to a broad range 




Throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, Kansas courts continued to 
expand the economic loss doctrine into various contexts.
132
  During this 
                                                          
 125.  Id. at 1261. 
 126.  Id. at 1263. 
 127.  Id. (noting the plaintiff’s arguments and stating “we find no compelling reason why the 
economic loss doctrine should not be applied to a claim against a contractor in residential 
construction defect cases”). 
 128.  Id. at 1262–63 (“Whether or not a house is deemed to be a ‘product,’ we find that the 
principles underlying the economic loss doctrine apply to a residential construction transaction.”). 
 129.  Id. at 1263. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See Breer & Pulikkan, supra note 5, at 34 (concluding that the effect of Northwest 
Arkansas Masonry and Prendiville is that “Kansas courts do not recognize a cause of action for 
negligent construction where there is no personal injury or damage to other property”). 
 132.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Case Corp., 993 P.2d 650, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the 
doctrine to consumer products liability claims); Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods., 
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time, Kansas courts applied the economic loss doctrine to all economic loss 
claims.  However, with David v. Hett, Coker v. Siler, and Rinehart v. Morton 
Buildings, Kansas courts began to limit the reach of the doctrine at least in 
the home construction context.
133
  These cases effectively halted the 
expansion of the doctrine, overruled precedent, and opened the door to tort 
recovery in economic loss home construction cases.
134
  Although the cases 
properly recognized that the justifications for the economic loss doctrine do 
not exist in the home construction context, the cases created several 
problems for future application of the doctrine. 
With the advent of tort liability for some economic loss claims in 
Kansas, these cases introduced several problems for future application of the 
doctrine.  First, it is unclear whether the limitations of these cases will be 
expanded outside the home construction context.  Although reform of the 
doctrine in other areas does not seem likely now, several problems may arise 
if the same limitations are applied outside the home construction context.  
Second, by allowing tort liability for economic loss claims, these cases 
further complicate the lines between tort and warranty law.  Finally, these 
cases create scope of liability issues regarding which home defect claims 
should be actionable in tort.  The Kansas courts can reduce the potential for 
these problems by incorporating the independent duty rule and several 
factors into their economic loss doctrine analysis.  The David, Coker, and 
Rinehart courts touched on the independent duty rule and some of these 
factors but did not explicitly adopt them.  The courts can form a more 
predictable and accurate analysis by adopting these solutions in future 
economic loss cases. 
A. The Three Kansas Economic Loss Cases 
After more than a decade of the doctrine’s expansion, three Kansas 
cases changed the application of the economic loss doctrine in the home 
construction context.  David v. Hett, Coker v. Siler, and Rinehart v. Morton 
Buildings, Inc. each allowed tort recovery for economic loss claims in the 
home construction context.  These cases introduced the possibility of tort 
                                                          
Inc., 31 P.3d 982, 986–87 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the doctrine to a claim in the construction 
context for defective cement); Prendiville, 83 P.3d 1257 (applying the doctrine to a residential 
construction defect case). 
 133.  See David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102 (Kan. 2011); Coker v. Siler, 304 P.3d 689 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2013); Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 305 P.3d 622 (Kan. 2013). 
 134.  See David, 270 P.3d at 1113 (overruling Prendiville); Coker, 304 P.3d at 694 (limiting 
economic loss doctrine in home construction case); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 631 (holding that 
economic loss doctrine does not bar negligent misrepresentation in home construction context). 
  
1344 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
liability for economic loss claims in at least one context and began 
discussing exceptions to the doctrine that might limit its application in other 
contexts. 
1. David v. Hett 
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Kansas reconsidered the economic loss 
doctrine in the home construction context in David v. Hett.
135
  In David, the 
homeowners brought claims of “breach of contract, negligence, fraud, 
fraudulent concealment, and violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection 
Act” against their contractor after they experienced settling in their home.
136
  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor on 
all claims.
137
  The court found that the statute of limitations barred the 
homeowners’ contract and Consumer Protection Act claims and that the 
homeowners failed to prove the elements of their fraud claims.
138
  The 
district court held that the economic loss doctrine barred the negligence 
claim, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed.
139
  Before David, the 
bright-line rule established in Prendiville barred economic loss claims in 
construction cases.
140
  The David court reversed this rule and held that the 
economic loss doctrine did not bar homeowners’ claims against a contractor 
for negligently performed construction services.
141
  The court explained 




First, the David court addressed the policy rationale that warranty 
remedies are sufficient when the only damage is to a product itself.
143
  The 
court emphasized the nature of the claim in this case as involving a service 
rather than a product, and found this distinction important in light of the 
                                                          
 135.  David, 270 P.3d 1102. 
 136.  Id. at 1104. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257, 1264 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (“We 
hold the economic loss doctrine recognized in Kansas in [Koss Construction] and subsequent cases 
applies to a claim against a contractor in residential construction defect cases where the rights and 
liabilities of the parties are governed by contract and an express warranty.”), overruled by David, 
270 P.3d 1102. 
 141.  David, 270 P.3d at 1114 (“[W]e overrule the Prendiville court’s extension of the doctrine 
to homeowners’ claims against a residential contractor.”). 
 142.  Id. at 1113 (“We find these policy rationales do not readily apply to parties to a home 
construction contract and should not cause us to revise our existing caselaw.”).  
 143.  Id. 
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warranty policy.
144
  The court explained that, although this policy seemed 
appropriate in the context of products cases, it was inappropriate for services 
cases.
145
  The Kansas Uniform Commercial Code for sales applies “to 
transactions in goods, not services,” and because of this the court found that 
warranty law did not provide a remedy for services claims.
146
  The court 
therefore recognized the services exception as an effective limitation on the 
economic loss doctrine without explicitly adopting it.
147
  Additionally, the 
court found that the exception’s rationale “is easily applied to residential 
construction contracts such as the one at issue in this case.”
148
 
Several jurisdictions have endorsed this view and allowed tort recovery 
for services—especially professional services—in economic loss cases.
149
  
However, a significant number of courts have expressly rejected the services 
exception as an inadequate basis for distinction in economic loss cases.
150
  
These courts find that the economic loss doctrine has just as high an interest 
in precluding services tort claims—at least professional services tort 
claims—as it does precluding products tort claims.
151
  This argument seems 
to have significant weight in Kansas.  Although services are not explicitly 
covered by the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code, most services are 
covered by warranty law through the duty to perform services “in a 
workmanlike manner.”
152
  However, the implied warranty to perform 
services in a workmanlike manner does not apply in Kansas to all services, 
such as professional services by a doctor or lawyer, so tort recovery for 
                                                          
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 1113–14 (noting the services exception as one reason for not applying the economic 
loss doctrine and stating “several jurisdictions have found the economic loss doctrine is not well 
suited for contracts to supply services”). 
 148.  Id. at 1114. 
 149.  See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 472 (Wis. 2004) 
(holding that the “economic loss doctrine is inapplicable . . . for the negligent provision of 
services”); Cargill, Inc. v. Boag Cold Storage Warehouse, Inc., 71 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(doctrine applies to transaction in goods, not services); McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter 
Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the economic loss doctrine does 
not apply if the contract is not governed by the UCC). 
 150.  See Ins. Co., 688 N.W.2d at 467 (“As one treatise noted, ‘[t]he judiciary remains 
hopelessly divided on whether the doctrine should be extended to services.’”). 
 151.  EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497, 508 (Vt. 2007) (holding that in the absence of a 
professional relationship, “there was no special duty of care created beyond the terms of the 
construction contract and no exception to the economic-loss rule applies”).  
 152.  See Zenda Grain & Supply Co. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 894 P.2d 881, 890 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1995) (“The law in Kansas and, indeed, the general rule throughout the United States is that there is 
‘implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform it skillfully, carefully, diligently, 
and in a workmanlike manner.’”). 
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economic loss caused by these services may be appropriate.
153
  In the 
absence of warranty law in these professional services cases, tort recovery 
may be justified.  Although the services exception may not be an adequate 
basis for distinction in itself, it can still help define the line between tort and 
warranty law. 
The David court also addressed the nature of the homeowners’ claim in 
light of the warranty rationale.
154
  The court stated that because home defects 
are often discovered after the warranty time period has expired, warranty 
law offers little protection to homeowners.
155
  Because of these reasons, the 
court found that the warranty rationale for the doctrine did not apply in this 
case.
156
  This conclusion marks a sharp contrast from that in Prendiville, 




The court next considered the policy of promoting bargaining among 
parties in the home construction context.
158
  The court found this policy 
inapplicable to residential construction cases because of the often-disparate 
bargaining positions of the parties.
159
  The court found that applying the 
doctrine in this case would unilaterally benefit the contractor.
160
  Therefore, 
the court found the nature of the contract—between a consumer and a 
business—important in determining the applicability of the doctrine.
161
  This 
conclusion also diverges from Prendiville, where the court rejected the 
homeowner’s argument that due to “the inexperience of a buyer in 
negotiating contracts, a buyer should not be precluded from maintaining a 
negligence action against a contractor.”
162
 
Finally, the court found the economic loss doctrine’s focus on 
                                                          
 153.  Tamarac Dev. Co. v. Delamater, Freund & Assocs., P.A., 675 P.2d 361, 365 (Kan. 1984) 
(explaining that “it can be said certain professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, are not subject” to 
the implied warranty to perform services in a workmanlike manner, but can be liable in tort for 
malpractice).  
 154.  David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1114 (Kan. 2011). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. (stating that the court rejects the warranty rationale and other reasons used by 
Prendiville to justify application of the economic loss doctrine). 
 157.  See generally Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2004), overruled by David, 270 P.3d 1102. 
 158.  David, 270 P.3d at 1114. 
 159.  Id. (“[C]ontracts governing residential construction rarely involve the sophisticated parties 
with equal bargaining positions present in commercial products cases.”). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. (“The doctrine’s application in this context would unequally benefit the contractor.”). 
 162.  Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1263. 
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consequences troubling in the residential construction context.
163
  Under the 
doctrine, a contractor would be liable in tort only if an economic harm 
turned into a physical injury.
164
  Tort liability under the doctrine simply turns 
on a matter of timing.
165
  A homeowner who discovers a construction defect 
pre-injury will save her contractor from tort liability.
166
  This conclusion 
indicates that the court considered the gravity of harm that a defect causes, 
even if the defect ultimately causes only economic loss.  This analysis was 
also missing in previous economic loss cases in Kansas.
167
  For these policy 
reasons, the supreme court overruled Prendiville’s application of the 
economic loss doctrine to residential construction claims.
168
 
2. Coker v. Siler 
The Kansas Court of Appeals solidified the David holding in the 2013 
case of Coker v. Siler.
169
  Coker involved a claim by a homeowner after a 
water line separated and caused cracking in the home’s foundation and 
walls.
170
  The homeowner sued the seller of the home for breach of express 
warranty and sued the plumber who caused the damage for negligence.
171
  
The district court dismissed the claim against the plumber based on the 
economic loss doctrine.
172
  The court of appeals reversed the dismissal and 
reiterated the reasoning in David, holding that the homeowner’s negligence 
claim against the plumber was not barred by the economic loss doctrine.
173
  
Therefore, even though the terms of the contract might have prevented the 
homeowner from seeking various remedies, the homeowner would be able to 
recover from the construction company if the homeowner could prove a 
breach of a duty “independent of the underlying construction contract.”
174
  
                                                          
 163.  David, 270 P.3d at 1114 (“Finally, we agree with the analysis in Kennedy in which the 
South Carolina Supreme Court found the economic loss doctrine’s application to home construction 
troubling because it focused on the consequence or damages, rather than the duty breached.”). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. (“[O]ne contractor could be lucky enough to escape liability because the negligence was 
discovered before someone was harmed.”). 
 166.  Id. (stating that under the doctrine a contractor can “escape liability because the negligence 
was discovered before someone was harmed”). 
 167.  See generally Prendiville, 83 P.3d 1257 (considering the type of injury created rather than 
the harm created). 
 168.  David, 270 P.3d at 1114. 
 169.  Coker v. Siler, 304 P.3d 689 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). 
 170.  Id. at 692. 
 171.  Id. at 691. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 694–95 (citing David in applying the economic loss doctrine).  
 174.  Id. at 695. 
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Because the court found that the plumber who installed the water line owed 
the homeowner an independent legal duty “to perform plumbing services 
without causing economic injury to third parties,” the court allowed the 
homeowner’s negligence claim against the plumber.
175
  As discussed above, 
courts in various jurisdictions have adopted this independent duty analysis in 
economic loss cases.
176
  However, in previous Kansas cases the courts did 




3.   Rinehart v. Morton Buildings, Inc. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas next reconsidered the economic loss 
doctrine in the 2013 case of Rinehart v. Morton Buildings, Inc.  In Rinehart, 
the owners of a building sued the construction company on theories of 
breach of contract, breach of warranty, violation of the Kansas Consumer 
Protection Act, and negligent misrepresentation.
178
  The owners planned to 
use the building both as a home and for their cellophane slitting business, 
but they claimed that the contractor “misrepresented that the building 
complied with the plans and specifications.”
179
  The jury awarded damages 
to the owners on each of the theories.
180
  The supreme court held that the 
economic loss doctrine does not apply to negligent misrepresentation 
claims.
181
  The court explained economic loss recovery in negligent 
misrepresentation claims based on the same rationale in David—that 
warranty law does not govern or provide an adequate remedy for negligent 
misrepresentation claims.
182
  The court also stated that the effect of applying 
the doctrine in this case would be that parties would need to “enter a contract 
or risk having no rights at all.”
183
  Finally, the court found that, because 
negligent misrepresentation claims already have built-in limitations on 
liability, it is not necessary to apply the doctrine to these cases to restrict 
                                                          
 175.  Id. at 696. 
 176.  E.g., Crouse, supra note 88, at 452–53 (explaining the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
application of the independent duty rule). 
 177.  See Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257, 1262–64 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) 
(citing a case that did not apply the economic loss rule because of an independent tort duty, but 
rejecting that conclusion); Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods., Inc., 31 P.3d 982 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2001); Koss Const. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
 178.  Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 305 P.3d 622, 625 (Kan. 2013). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 632. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
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downstream liability.
184
  For these reasons the court adopted the bright-line 




David, Coker, and Rinehart represent a marked shift in approach to the 
economic loss doctrine.  For the first time since the doctrine’s adoption in 
Kansas, the courts held that the doctrine did not apply to cases in which the 
plaintiffs claimed only economic losses. The courts also for the first time 
endorsed several exceptions and policies that limit the doctrine.  David and 
Coker recognized the independent duty rule and the bargaining positions of 
the parties, and Rinehart adopted the bright-line rule that the doctrine does 
not apply to negligent misrepresentation claims.
186
  These cases opened the 
door to tort liability for economic loss claims at least in the residential 
construction context and raised issues as to the scope of liability allowed 
when only economic loss is claimed. 
B. The Impact of the Three Kansas Cases 
David, Coker, and Rinehart opened the door to tort liability in home 
construction economic loss cases in Kansas.  Although the cases reached the 
correct conclusion in limiting the doctrine in the home construction context, 
this new approach creates problems for application of the doctrine in future 
cases. 
1. The Kansas Courts Appropriately Limited the Economic Loss 
Doctrine in the Home Construction Context 
These three cases properly limited the economic loss doctrine’s 
application to the home construction context.  The justifications for the 
economic loss doctrine do not exist in the home construction context.  First, 
the nature of home construction claims is not well suited for the economic 
loss doctrine.
187
  Warranty claims are not subject to the discovery rule.
188
  
                                                          
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1114 (Kan. 2011) (noting the bargaining positions of the 
parties and stating that recognition of the doctrine in this case “would unequally benefit the 
contractor”); Coker v. Siler, 304 P.3d 689, 696 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the economic loss 
doctrine did not apply in part because the duty arose independent of the parties’ contract); Rinehart, 
305 P.3d at 632. 
 187.  See David, 270 P.3d 1102; A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 114 
P.3d 862, 869 (Colo. 2005) (economic loss doctrine did not bar homeowners association’s tort claim 
against subcontractors because subcontractors owed an “independent duty to act without negligence 
in the construction of homes”). 
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Therefore, home construction defects that cause only economic loss and are 
discovered after the warranty statute of limitations expires are not 
actionable.  Second, as the court in David recognized, homeowners are 
typically inexperienced in negotiating the terms of a warranty.
189
  
Homeowners should not be prevented from bringing common law 
negligence claims that are not covered by the terms of their warranty.  
Finally, home construction claims often arise from conduct outside the terms 
of the parties’ contract.
190
  When this occurs, courts should not prevent a 
homeowner’s independent negligence claims.  For these reasons, the courts 
in David, Coker, and Rinehart properly found that the economic loss 
doctrine should not apply in home construction cases. 
2. Problems the Recent Kansas Cases Created for Future Application of 
the Doctrine 
The addition of David, Coker, and Rinehart to the economic loss 
doctrine landscape creates three distinct problems for future application of 
the doctrine in Kansas.  First, it is unclear whether the courts intended to 
alter—by placing limitations on—the economic loss doctrine only in 
residential construction cases, or whether these cases signal the beginning of 
tort claims for economic loss in other contexts.  The limitations these cases 
imposed on the doctrine cannot be applied as easily outside the home 
construction context, and allowing tort recovery in economic loss cases in 
other contexts may create scope of liability problems.  Second, these cases 
seem to further complicate the distinction between warranty law and tort law 
claims.  Finally, the scope of liability as to the types of home defects 
recoverable in tort creates problems for analysis of home construction 
economic loss claims. 
a. Problems Related to Limiting the Doctrine Outside the Home 
Construction Context 
At first glance, the holdings in David, Coker, and Rinehart seem 
relatively limited.  David and Coker allow tort recovery of economic loss in 
                                                          
 188.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1963) (defining the discovery rule and listing causes of action 
subject to discovery rule); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY § 47:27 (1987) (explaining that 
warranty causes of action are not subject to tolling of statute of limitations except where warranty 
provides for future performance). 
 189.  David, 270 P.3d at 1114. 
 190.  Coker, 304 P.3d at 695–96 (remanding case for determination whether the defendant’s duty 
arose independent of the parties’ contract).  
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home construction service projects, and Rinehart allows such recovery in 
negligent misrepresentation claims within the same context.  Each case is 
limited to the home construction context and does not explicitly alter the 
economic loss doctrine outside this context.  However, it is unclear whether 
these limitations to the doctrine may in the future be applied outside the 
home construction context, and Rinehart explicitly leaves this question 
open.
191
  If the courts begin to limit the economic loss doctrine outside the 
home construction context, the reasoning used by the recent cases for such 
limitations breaks down and potential problems with scope of liability arise. 
In David and Coker, the courts addressed the economic loss issue in the 
context of services contracts involving homeowners.
192
  These cases should, 
therefore, be viewed as limited to this context.  If the cases are truly limited 
in this way, there is support for a professional services exception or a 
distinction based on consumers in the context of home construction cases.
193
  
The David and Coker courts each stated the rationales for excluding liability 
in these contexts—services are not covered by warranty law in Article 2 of 
the UCC and consumers typically have less bargaining power than business 
parties in the same situations.
194
  Therefore, the courts’ decisions seem 
logical when viewed in light of these exceptions. 
However, if the Kansas courts alter their approach to the economic loss 
doctrine outside the context of residential construction cases, the exceptions 
that the courts rely on break down.  In residential construction cases, it is 
already difficult to justify a distinction on the basis of differences between 
consumers and business parties.  Some cases, including Rinehart, involve 
parties that could be characterized as either consumers or business 
entities.
195
  If the courts begin to limit the doctrine in business transactions 
based on the same rationale, it can be even more difficult to make 
straightforward rules based on bargaining power because of the disparities in 
                                                          
 191.  Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 633 (“We leave for another day whether the doctrine should extend 
elsewhere.”). 
 192.  David, 270 P.3d at 1103 (economic loss claim involving service contract for excavation, 
basement, and concrete work); Coker, 304 P.3d at 691 (negligence claim based on service contract 
for plumbing work).  
 193.  See 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Grp., Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 832 (Wis. 2006) (citing 
Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Wis. 2004)) (“If the contract is purely a 
service contract, the economic loss doctrine does not apply.”); see also Gary M. Victor, The 
Economic Loss Doctrine and Consumers,  MICH. B. J., Sep. 2010, at 23 (describing reluctance of 
courts to apply the doctrine to consumers in fraud cases and other contexts). 
 194.  David, 270 P.3d at 1113–14; Coker, 304 P.3d at 694. 
 195.  Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 625 (explaining that the plaintiffs planned to use the structure as both 
their home residence and business location). 
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bargaining power between smaller companies and large corporations.
196
  
Although the nature of the parties may be a proper distinction for application 
of the doctrine in the home construction context, this distinction is less 
useful in other contexts.  Therefore, the rule explained in David and Coker 
seems simple at first, but quickly becomes more convoluted when applied to 
different sets of facts. 
Allowing tort recovery for economic loss cases outside the home 
construction context also might create problems regarding the scope of tort 
liability.  In the business context, economic damages can affect many 
parties.  A negligently constructed foundation affects everyone in an office 
building, and pipes that burst in a strip mall might flood multiple businesses.  
In home construction cases usually only one party—the homeowner—brings 
a tort claim, thereby naturally limiting the potential sphere of liability.  But 
the same cannot be said in the business context, and therefore the economic 
loss doctrine cannot as easily be limited in this area.  Although the courts did 
not expressly state that they were prepared to expand the limitations outside 
the residential construction context, the courts did leave this question 
unanswered. 
b. Blurring of Lines Between Warranty and Tort Law 
These three cases effectively changed the way economic loss 
construction claims are viewed in Kansas.  Each held that the specific 
economic loss claims might be recoverable in tort.
197
  Courts and 
commentators have struggled for decades to delineate the line between 
warranty and tort law, and there likely is no clear line between the two.
198
  
However, in product and construction cases tort law has typically been 
                                                          
 196.  See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 142 
(2005) (stating that the concept of bargaining power “imposes substantial costs upon actors who are 
traditionally viewed as possessing bargaining power, including small businesses and middle-class 
consumers”). 
 197.  See David, 270 P.3d at 1115 (remanding for lower court to determine whether claim arises 
in tort or contract); Coker, 304 P.3d at 695 (“Coker’s tort claims will survive only if Coker can 
establish that Chaney owed Coker a duty imposed by law.”); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 627 
(acknowledging plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation tort claim). 
 198.   See Cent. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Stemmons Nw. Bank, N.A., 848 S.W.2d 232, 238 (Tex. 
App. 1992) (“[I]t is often difficult in practice to determine whether a plaintiff’s cause of action 
sounds in contract or tort.”); Catherine Paskoff Chang, Two Wrongs Can Make Two Rights: Why 
Courts Should Allow Tortious Recovery for Intentional Concealment of Contract Breach, 39 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47, 56 (2005) (noting the “frequent difficulty in distinguishing between 
tort and contract claims”); Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic 
Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 428 (1997) (stating that “courts often have 
difficulty distinguishing between tort and contract negligence actions”). 
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characterized by its focus on personal or property damage, rather than on 
economic loss.
199
  This is not to say that tort law has been completely 
reluctant to address economic losses.
200
  Negligent misrepresentation 
provides a good example of a cause of action in tort that is primarily 
concerned with economic losses.
201
  But when economic losses are involved 
and a claim includes both warranty and tort elements, the economic loss 
doctrine has attempted to draw a recognizable distinction between the two 
theories. 
In each of these three cases, the claims could have been addressed 
through contract and were arguably better suited for contract law.
202
  
Allowing tort recovery in each of these cases therefore makes the distinction 
between warranty and tort law more convoluted.  Contract law—and by 
extension, warranty law—focuses on agreements, and its core concern is 
ensuring that parties receive the benefit of their bargain.
203
  In each of the 
three recent cases, the parties agreed to the terms of the service to be 
rendered—the construction or improvement of a house.
204
  After the services 
were performed, the plaintiffs discovered conditions that did not conform to 
or were outside the scope of the parties’ agreements.  The damages in each 
case were not bodily harm or property damage, but economic losses.
205
  
Therefore, these claims were probably more suitable for consideration 
within the context of warranty law, and the plaintiffs recognized this by 
                                                          
 199.  See B.E. WITKIN ET AL., 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1162 (10th ed. 2005) 
(“Generally, tort law provides a remedy for construction defects that cause property damage or 
personal injury.”); DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCT LIABILITY § 17:13 (3d 
ed. 1999) (“[W]hen a product damages only itself, tort law provides no remedy and the action lies in 
contract; but when personal injury or other property damage occurs, a tort remedy may be 
appropriate.”). 
 200.  See supra Part II.B for a discussion of exceptions to economic loss doctrine. 
 201.  See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276–77 (N.Y. 1922) (recognizing contract principles 
but allowing third-party buyer to bring a negligent misrepresentation claim after defendant falsely 
reported weight of beans); Barton, supra note 9, at 1814 (“A tension emerges between negligent 
misrepresentation, which allows for the recovery of pecuniary loss, and the economic loss rule, 
which forbids recovery of economic loss in tort.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 202.  Each of the cases involved contract or warranty law claims along with the tort claims. 
David, 270 P.3d 1102; Rinehart, 305 P.3d 622; Coker, 304 P.3d 689.  
 203.  E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986). 
 204.  David, 270 P.3d at 1103 (describing the contract between the parties “for the excavation, 
basement, and concrete work” in the plaintiffs’ home); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 625 (discussing the 
contract between the parties for construction of a dual-purpose building); Coker, 304 P.3d at 691–92 
(describing the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant). 
 205.  David, 270 P.3d at 1104 (damages to footings in home and void under porch caused by 
construction defects); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 625 (negligent misrepresentation claim based on the 
overall condition of the structure); Coker, 304 P.3d at 692 (cracks in home’s walls and doors caused 
by water pipe leak). 
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bringing breach of warranty and breach of contract claims in addition to tort 
claims in each case.
206
 
Each of the courts, however, found that the claims were subject to tort 
analysis in addition to warranty law and contract law analysis.
207
  These 
findings are correct in that each claim had elements of tort as well as 
warranty law.  But, by preventing the application of the economic loss 
doctrine, these cases made tort law applicable to economic loss cases in the 
construction context, which have traditionally been subject to warranty law.  
These cases opened the door to tort law analysis in the economic loss home 
construction context, and therefore the courts must now determine which 
home construction defects tort law is prepared to recognize. 
c. The Unlimited Liability Problem in Home Construction Economic 
Loss Cases 
The main concern with opening up these home construction economic 
loss claims to tort law analysis is the potential for unlimited liability.  Under 
warranty law, these claims would be subject to whatever limitations are 
imposed by the warranty.
208
  Under a tort law analysis, however, the courts 
are free to impose liability whenever a proper basis for fault is found.
209
  
This opens the door to liability in a wide range of cases; liability is no longer 
limited to the terms of the warranty, but to the harms that tort law deems 
actionable.  Whereas the parties might limit liability to certain items within a 
house through warranties, the rule in these cases allows liability for a leaking 
roof, a cracked wall, or anything else that is a foreseeable harm.  The statutes 
of limitation in Kansas combined with the nature of residential construction 
claims curb the concern for unlimited liability as far as time and parties 
involved, but the scope of liability as far as the type of claims plaintiffs can 
bring is still unclear. 
The potential for unlimited liability is less troubling in these home 
construction cases for two reasons.  First, in Kansas the statute of limitations 
for torts after discovery is three years, and all claims are limited to ten years, 
                                                          
 206.  David, 270 P.3d at 1104 (listing breach of contract among plaintiff’s claims); Rinehart, 305 
P.3d at 625 (noting that jury awarded plaintiffs damages on breach of contract claim at trial); Coker, 
304 P.3d at 691 (noting that plaintiff brought both breach of express warranty and negligence 
claims). 
 207.  See David, 270 P.3d at 1114–15; Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 630–33; Coker, 304 P.3d at 694–96.  
 208.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-316 (2012). 
 209.  See David, 270 P.3d at 1115 (remanding for determination whether an independent tort 
duty was breached). 
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thereby limiting the claims a homeowner can bring to within a decade.
210
  
Because of the statute of limitations, the builder does not need to worry 
about unlimited liability for an indeterminate time.  Second, as noted above, 
the home construction context limits liability in a unique way as to the 
parties who will bring claims.  In the residential context there is typically 
only one party making a claim, as opposed to other product liability cases, in 
which multiple buyers might make claims against a manufacturer.  
Therefore, the concern for extended liability to additional parties is also 
limited, at least in home construction cases. 
 However, it is still not clear what kind of claims a party in a 
construction context can make.  If David’s holding is interpreted broadly as 
limiting the economic loss doctrine in all residential construction defect 
cases, plaintiffs can bring claims in tort for any economic loss in the home 
construction context.
211
  But this seems to extend the rule too far.  Can 
plaintiffs bring a claim for small defects not addressed in the warranty if the 
defect is not discovered until eight or nine years after the project’s 
completion?  Or is there some sort of limitation the courts can place on these 
claims to ensure that the most troubling defects, such as cracks in a 
foundation, are addressed without opening the floodgates to every type of 
home defect being litigated? The issue therefore becomes not who or when 
courts want to protect through tort liability, but what claims should be 
actionable when only economic losses are involved.  David, Rinehart, and 
Coker do not provide a clear answer to this problem, but guidance on the 
types of economic loss claims that can be brought is essential to balancing 
the economic loss doctrine with the need for tort protection. 
C. Solutions to the Economic Loss Doctrine Problems in Kansas 
Although the three cases left open the question of whether the courts 
would limit the doctrine in the same ways outside the home construction 
context, there is no indication that the courts are prepared to limit the 
doctrine in these ways now.  Therefore, the most pressing problems arise in 
the residential construction context.  The question becomes what kind of 
defects Kansas courts should allow in the home construction context outside 
the parties’ contract when the only damages are economic losses.  David, 
Coker, and Rinehart found the potential for tort liability based on cracks in a 
                                                          
 210.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (2012). 
 211.  The court declined to adopt the economic loss doctrine in “disputes between homeowners 
and their contractors.”  David, 270 P.3d at 1103 (suggesting that the holding would apply to nearly 
all economic loss claims in residential construction cases). 
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home’s foundation and walls and on non-compliance with a contractor’s 
plans that caused problems with doors and foundations.
212
  However, it is 
not clear in what other situations the courts would impose liability despite 
the economic loss doctrine.  There likely is no easy answer or a clear bright 
line to help determine the types of claims that should be actionable in tort.  
But it still may be possible to define a narrow slice of cases in which it is 
appropriate to apply the discovery rule through tort law to extend the time in 
which a party can make a claim. 
Kansas courts can help prevent scope of liability problems and better 
define the line between warranty and tort law by adopting several solutions.  
First, the Kansas courts should adopt the independent duty rule.  Second, the 
courts can apply several factors to determine whether tort liability is 
appropriate in a given home construction economic loss case.  These factors 
should include the gravity of harm that the defect causes, the bargaining 
positions of the parties, the nature of the source of the claim as a product or 
service, and whether the defect created a non-economic risk of harm.  David, 
Coker, and Rinehart addressed the independent duty rule and almost all the 
factors listed above.
213
  However, they did not expressly adopt these 
solutions in their analysis of tort liability for the claims.  By adopting these 
solutions, the courts will be able to more easily determine which home 
construction economic loss claims are recoverable in tort and create a 
framework for analyzing tort liability in other economic loss contexts. 
1. The Independent Duty Rule 
Kansas courts can help prevent scope of liability problems in economic 
loss cases by adopting the independent duty rule, which has been adopted in 
Colorado and other jurisdictions.
214
  As explained above, the independent 
duty rule bars tort liability when a defendant’s duty can be traced to both a 
                                                          
 212.  David, 270 P.3d at 1104 (stating that the plaintiff sought damages “in order to bring the 
house into compliance with the plans, specifications and drawings that were originally agreed upon 
between the plaintiffs and defendant as the proper construction for [the] house”); Rinehart, 305 P.3d 
at 625 (explaining that the jury “determined Morton willfully misrepresented that the building 
complied with the plans and specifications and would include anchor bolts, roof fasteners, fire stops, 
a vapor barrier, and truss repairs”); Coker, 304 P.3d at 692–93. 
 213.  David, 270 P.3d at 1113–14 (discussing the relative bargaining experience of the parties, 
the nature of the alleged harm, and the suitability of the economic loss doctrine to services 
contracts); Rinehart, 305 P.3d at 632 (discussing bargaining positions of parties); Coker, 304 P.3d at 
695 (analyzing whether the plaintiff’s claims arose independent of the parties’ contract). 
 214.  See Alma v. AZCO Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000) (“We hold that a party 
suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not 
assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.”). 
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contractual and common law tort source.
215
  The reasoning behind this rule 
is that it helps define the line between warranty and tort law claims by 
analyzing the source of the duty.
216
  Kansas courts should adopt the 
independent duty rule for three reasons.  First, it provides a simpler way to 
determine which claims are appropriate for tort law analysis and those that 
are more appropriate for warranty law analysis.  Second, it would help 
prevent the potential for unlimited liability in home construction cases by 
defining the scope of tort law.  Finally, it has been recognized by Kansas 
courts and other jurisdictions as an effective way to distinguish tort and 
warranty claims. 
The independent duty rule provides a simpler, more straightforward 
analysis than pure application of the economic loss doctrine.  The economic 
loss doctrine, in its purest form, focuses on the damages a claimant seeks.
217
  
This may provide a starting point for analysis of whether a claim should be 
actionable in warranty or tort.
218
  However, some claims, such as negligent 
misrepresentation, are pure tort claims but focus largely on economic 
losses.
219
  The independent duty rule focuses on the source of the duty of the 
claim.
220
  This allows courts to determine whether a claim sounds in contract 
or tort.  Under the independent duty rule, if a claim arises independently in 
tort, outside the terms of a contract, it is actionable even if it seeks to remedy 
only economic losses.
221
  Courts and commentators have consistently stated 
that the purpose of the economic loss doctrine is to help distinguish between 
tort and warranty claims.
222
  The independent duty rule distinguishes 
between the two causes of action by locating the source of the duty without 
barring legitimate tort claims merely because they focus on economic losses. 
                                                          
 215.  Johnson, supra note 40, at 539–40. 
 216.  Katherine Heaton, Comment, Eastwood’s Answer to Alejandre’s Open Question: The 
Economic Loss Rule Should Not Bar Fraud Claims, 86 WASH. L. REV. 331, 349 (2011) (stating that 
the economic loss doctrine focuses on whether there is a “breach of a tort duty arising independently 
of the terms of the contract”). 
 217.  Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262–63 (“The phrase ‘economic loss rule’ necessarily implies that the 
focus of the inquiry under its analysis is on the type of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.”). 
 218.  Id. at 1263. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 1262–63. 
 221.  See Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 241 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Wash. 2010) (“[W]hile 
the harm can be described as an economic loss, it is more than that: it is an injury remediable in 
tort.”). 
 222.  Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262 (stating that the doctrine “serves to maintain a distinction between 
contract and tort law”); Louisburg Bldg. & Dev. Co. v. Albright, 252 P.3d 597, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2011) (stating that the doctrine serves “as the dividing line between contract and the broader array of 
tort claims”); see also Christopher Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract 
Warranty Law from Drowning in A Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591, 594 (1995). 
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Adoption of the independent duty rule would also help prevent the 
prospect of unlimited liability in home construction economic loss cases.  
The independent duty rule prevents tort liability when the same tort duty can 
be found in the parties’ contract.
223
  The only time when tort liability would 
apply to economic loss claims would be when a term within the contract 
does not cover the same tort duty.  In these cases, the plaintiff would still 
need to demonstrate the existence of an independent tort duty.
224
  Therefore, 
tort liability would be limited to economic loss cases in which a contract 
does not cover a specific duty and an independent tort duty can be found.  
This narrow window of liability would help reasonably limit the types of 
cases plaintiffs could bring to those in which a legitimate tort duty could be 
found. 
Kansas courts and other jurisdictions have recognized the soundness of 
the independent duty rule.  In David, the Kansas Supreme Court cited cases 
from Colorado and Washington that had explicitly adopted the independent 
duty rule.
225
  The Supreme Court of Colorado adopted the independent duty 
rule in the 2000 case of Town of Alma v. AZCO Construction Inc.
226
  The 
court stated: 
In these situations where we have recognized the existence of a duty 
independent of any contractual obligations, the economic loss rule has 
no application and does not bar a plaintiff’s tort claim because the 
claim is based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus does 
not fall within the scope of the rule.
227
 
In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Washington completely substituted the independent duty rule analysis for 
the economic loss doctrine analysis.
228
  The court found that the relevant 
question was not whether economic losses were claimed as damages, but 
rather “whether the injury is traceable also to a breach of a tort law duty of 
care arising independently of the contract.”
229
  In David, the Kansas 
                                                          
 223.  David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1108 (Kan. 2011) (citing Alma, 10 P.3d at 1264) (explaining 
that under the independent duty rule, “a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an 
express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an 
independent duty of care under tort law”). 
 224.  David, 270 P.3d at 1115 (remanding case to determine whether the plaintiffs “specifically 
asserted any independent duty”). 
 225.  Id. at 1108 (citing Alma, 10 P.3d 1256; Eastwood, 241 P.3d 1256). 
 226.  Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262 n.8 (“[W]e believe that a more accurate designation of what is 
commonly termed the ‘economic loss rule’ would be the ‘independent duty rule.’”). 
 227.  Id. at 1263.  
 228.  Eastwood, 241 P.3d at 1268. 
 229.  Id. at 1264. 
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Supreme Court recognized the merit of the rule, but did not expressly adopt 
the independent duty rule for all economic loss cases.
230
  The court did, 
however, remand the case for consideration whether the tort claims arose 
independently from the parties’ contract.
231
  The David court recognized that 
the independent duty rule provided a similar analysis to the approach it had 
taken in other economic loss cases.
232
  The Coker court also seemed to 
implicitly adopt this rule by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the 
existence of an independent duty to prevent application of the economic loss 
doctrine.
233
  Although the Kansas Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted 
the independent duty rule, the Kansas courts have discussed the independent 




Kansas courts should adopt the independent duty rule as a way to 
simplify the economic loss doctrine and avoid the potential for unlimited 
liability in home construction cases.  The independent duty rule provides a 
straightforward approach to economic loss cases that focuses on the source 
of a warranty or tort duty rather than damages.  The rule could also help 
prevent unlimited liability by making liability dependent on the plaintiff 
finding a duty outside the terms of the parties’ contract.  Kansas courts have 
already recognized the merits of the rule, and official adoption of the rule 
would help the economic loss doctrine adhere to its true function in 
distinguishing between tort and warranty claims.
235
 
2. Factors to Help Analyze Tort Recovery in Home Construction 
Economic Loss Cases 
In addition to the independent duty rule, several factors may help in 
drawing distinctions between those home construction defects that should be 
actionable in tort and those that should be left to warranty law.  None of 
these factors are determinative in themselves, but when taken together, they 
                                                          
 230.  David, 270 P.3d at 1109 (stating that the “independent duty analysis mirrors the rationale 
used by this court over several years to distinguish between causes of action arising in tort from 
those in contract in various types of litigation, including home construction”). 
 231.  Id. at 1115. 
 232.  Id. at 1109. 
 233.  Coker v. Siler, 304 P.3d 689, 696 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). 
 234.  Id. at 695–96 (remanding case for determination whether plaintiff’s economic loss claim 
involved a duty independent of the underlying contract).  
 235.  David, 270 P.3d at 1110 (quoting Koss Const. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255, 259 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 1998)) (stating that the purpose of the doctrine is to establish “a logical demarcation 
between cases properly pursued as tort actions and those which are warranty claims”). 
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provide the basis for an accurate analysis of the claims.  First, courts should 
consider the risk of harm presented by the defect.
236
  Courts should also 
consider the nature of the parties involved and their relative bargaining 
positions.
237
  The distinction between services contracts and products claims 
may provide another basis for analyzing home construction defects.  Finally, 
whether a defect that causes economic loss also creates a risk of non-
economic harm can provide another basis for distinction in home 
construction cases. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, the courts should look to the 
gravity of the harm that the defect creates.
238
  An analysis of the magnitude 
of harm could help prevent the potential for unlimited liability in these cases.  
There may simply be some harms in the home construction context that do 
not trigger the motivations of tort law in protecting parties outside the 
confines of the marketplace.
239
  A plaintiff who brings an action based on 
the negligent fitting of a door and discovers this six years after construction 
of the home is sufficiently protected by warranty law.  On the other hand, a 
claimant who discovers that her home’s foundation has been gradually 
cracking because of negligent pouring of concrete may require the protection 
of tort law.  Distinguishing between those claims that are serious enough to 
require tort law protection and those that are not is difficult, and it does not 
provide a basis by itself for determining when the doctrine should apply.  
But by weighing the gravity of harm that a home defect causes, courts may 
be able to apply the doctrine in the construction context with less of a risk 
for unlimited liability. 
Another factor that might help distinguish which home defects should 
be actionable is the type of parties involved.  As the courts suggested, the 
                                                          
 236.  See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (“A consumer should not be 
charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a 
product on the market.”); Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 631 (Md. 1995) 
(quoting Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo.Inc. v. Whiting-Turner, 517 A.2d 336, 345 (Md. 
1986)) (“[T]he determination of whether a duty [in tort] will be imposed in [an economic loss case] 
should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous 
circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage.”). 
 237.  See Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 46, 54 (Wisc. 2004) (considering bargaining 
positions of parties in economic loss case). 
 238.  See Pub. Bldg. Auth. of Huntsville v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 So. 3d 171, 186 
(Ala. 2010) (stating as factors for tort liability consideration in economic loss cases “the moral blame 
attached to such conduct” and “the policy of preventing future harm”). 
 239.  See 14 CAL. JUR. 3D CONTRACTS § 2 (“[T]ort law is designed to vindicate social policy.”); 
see also Jay M. Feinman, Implied Warranty, Products Liability, and the Boundary Between Contract 
and Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469, 471 (1997) (describing tort law’s concern “with ‘social policy and 
risk allocation by means other than those dictated by the marketplace’” (quoting Denny v. Ford 
Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1995))). 
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bargaining positions of the parties affect whether the economic loss doctrine 
should apply.
240
  One of the policies supporting the economic loss doctrine is 
the promotion of bargaining between parties.
241
  Courts have recognized that 
applying the doctrine in a business setting is beneficial because business 
parties generally share equivalent bargaining power.
242
  As noted above in 
Part III.B.2.a, a distinction based on bargaining power is more necessary in 
the residential construction context than in the business context.
243
  
Similarly, in the construction context, a distinction based purely on whether 
the claimant is a consumer or business would not provide an adequate basis 
for determining whether to allow economic loss recovery.  Businesses may 
have the same bargaining position as some homeowners, and, as in Rinehart, 
a party may fit into both categories.
244
  However, by considering this factor 
along with the true bargaining positions of the parties, courts can better 
determine which home construction claims should be actionable in tort. 
The distinction between products and services could also serve as an 
effective basis for determining whether the doctrine should apply.  This is 
particularly relevant in the construction context, where a claim may involve 
both a product and a service.  Other jurisdictions have adopted the services 
exception as a way to determine which claims should be actionable in 
warranty law and which should be actionable in tort.
245
  Some jurisdictions, 
such as Wisconsin, apply the economic loss doctrine when a contract is 
predominantly for products rather than services.
246
  This rule might provide 
a good starting point in the construction context.  As noted above, the 
Kansas courts took this factor into consideration in preventing application of 
                                                          
 240.  See David, 270 P.3d at 1114 (citations omitted) (stating that one of the reasons for 
preventing application of the doctrine is that “contracts governing residential construction rarely 
involve the sophisticated parties with equal bargaining positions present in commercial products 
cases”). 
 241.  Id. at 1113–14 (addressing the bargaining policy, as explained in East River). 
 242.  E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873 (1986) (“Since a 
commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining power . . . we see no 
reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of the risk.”). 
 243.  See supra Part II.A.2. for discussion on the potential for economic loss doctrine reform 
outside the residential construction context. 
 244.  Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 305 P.3d 622, 625 (Kan. 2013) (explaining that the 
plaintiffs planned to use the structure as both their home residence and business location). 
 245.  Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67, 72 (Vt. 2001) (noting the existence of 
the exception but finding that plaintiff did not meet the requirements of the exception). 
 246.  1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Grp., Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 832 (Wis. 2006) (citing 
Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wisc. 2005)) (“[I]f the contract is a mixed 
contract for products and services, whether the economic loss doctrine applies depends upon whether 
the contract is predominantly for a product or for services.”). 
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the doctrine to home construction cases.
247
  But when a home construction 
contract is based predominantly on goods, warranty law adequately 
addresses the economic loss claims through Article 2 of the UCC.  
Therefore, a determination of whether a claim is based on services or 
products could help in establishing a clearer line for when the economic loss 
doctrine should apply. 
It might also be helpful for courts to consider whether a condition that 
creates an economic loss also creates a risk of non-economic harm.  In the 
home construction context, some defective conditions do not create the risk 
of physical injury while others do create such a risk. For example, a door 
negligently installed that simply lets in cold air likely creates only economic 
loss.  A negligently constructed roof may cause only economic loss when the 
leak is not significant.  By contrast, a negligently constructed foundation 
may create a risk of physical injury if the walls of the house are capable of 
caving in.  The David opinion addressed this factor in passing by stating its 
concern with contractors escaping tort liability simply because a dangerous 
condition coincidently causes only economic harm rather than personal 
injury.
248
  Holding contractors liable for dangerous conditions when they 
cause economic harm may promote more careful construction and prevent 
injuries.  If a condition has the potential for creating danger, a contractor 
would likely use greater care in its installation.  The economic loss doctrine 
contemplates risk allocation for economic losses, but distinguishes this from 
personal injury claims, in which risk allocation is discouraged.
249
  When a 
risk of bodily harm arises but only economic losses ultimately result, it 
seems that tort law would have an interest in deterring the allocation of the 
risk of bodily harm between the parties.  The economic loss doctrine could 
still apply to claims that do not create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. 
The Kansas courts seemed to emphasize these factors in their analysis of 
the economic loss claims in front of them.
250
  By incorporating these factors 
                                                          
 247.  As noted previously, warranty law seems to apply to service contracts with the duty to 
perform services in “a workmanlike manner,” but Kansas courts may still have an interest in 
applying tort law to professional claims, which are not subject to this implied warranty. See supra 
note 153. 
 248.  David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1114 (Kan. 2011). 
 249.  See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Wis. 2005) (“The economic loss 
doctrine, therefore, differentiates between economic losses, for which risk sharing is encouraged, 
and other losses, such as personal injury losses, where risk sharing is undesirable as a matter of 
public policy.”). 
 250.  David, 270 P.3d at 1113–14 (discussing the relative bargaining experience of the parties, 
the nature of the alleged harm, and the suitability of the economic loss doctrine to services 
contracts); Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 305 P.3d 622, 632 (Kan. 2013) (discussing bargaining 
positions of parties). 
  
2014] KANSAS ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 1363 
into economic loss analysis in other home construction cases, the courts 
could allow tort recovery when it is appropriate while properly limiting the 
sphere of liability.  None of these factors provides a suitable basis for 
analysis in itself, but taken together they might help prevent the potential for 
unlimited liability when the economic loss doctrine is repealed in home 
construction cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The confusion surrounding the economic loss doctrine fuels 
innumerable applications of the doctrine throughout the United States.  
Some jurisdictions apply the economic loss doctrine in a wide range of 
contexts, effectively limiting plaintiffs to warranty claims when they seek 
economic loss damages.
251
  Others have chosen from a menu of exceptions 
to help reign in the scope of the doctrine.
252
  In Kansas, courts initially 
expanded the doctrine from products cases to construction and services 
claims. 
However, David, Coker, and Rinehart explicitly limited the doctrine in 
at least some construction cases.  Read broadly, these cases allow tort 
recovery for any economic loss claim in the home construction context when 
a plaintiff can find a legal duty outside the confines of the parties’ contract.  
But this reading opens the door to tort liability in other economic loss 
contexts, blurs the line further between warranty and tort law, and creates 
the potential for unlimited liability in home construction cases.  Therefore, 
courts must consider which home construction defects are worthy of 
additional protection outside of warranty law when the only harm caused is 
economic loss.  By adopting the independent duty rule and applying several 
factors to economic loss doctrine analysis, the Kansas courts can prevent 
application of the doctrine in the most troubling home construction cases 
while also reasonably limiting the scope of tort liability in economic loss 
cases. 
 
                                                          
 251.  See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 6. 
 252.  Id.   
